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Abstract—To face future reliability challenges, it is necessary to quantify the risk of error in any part of a computing system. To this
goal, the Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF) has long been used for chips. However, this metric is used for offline characterisation,
which is inappropriate for memory. We survey the literature and formalise one of the metrics used, the Memory Vulnerability Factor, and
extend it to take into account false errors. These are reported errors which would have no impact on the program if they were ignored.
We measure the False Error Aware MVF (FEA) and related metrics precisely in a cycle-accurate simulator, and compare them with the
effects of injecting faults in a program’s data, in native parallel runs. Our findings show that MVF and FEA are the only two metrics that
are safe to use at runtime, as they both consistently give an upper bound on the probability of incorrect program outcome. FEA gives a
tighter bound than MVF, and is the metric that correlates best with the incorrect outcome probability of all considered metrics.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
R ELIABILITY is a major roadblock to successfully designever smaller and more power efficient high performance
computers [1]. Fault rates in transistors and DRAM cells keep
increasing with their miniaturization, and a shift in paradigm
to gain in energy efficiency, such as using near-threshold volt-
age [2], could decuplate the effects of soft errors.
In order to assess the reliability implications of system de-
sign decisions, Mukherjee et al. devised a metric: the Architec-
tural Vulnerability Factor (AVF) [3], which allows to accurately
model the error rate of a chip. This metric quantifies whether
a given bit matters for reliability, using the probability that a
fault at this bit may cause an error in the final outcome of
a program. Averaging this value per component for various
workloads indicates which components require error mitigat-
ing techniques. For example, a speculative component such
as a branch predictor will never affect reliability, while an
instruction decode unit has a major impact on any program.
In memory subsystems however, all storage bits are uni-
formly protected with the same level of Error Correcting Code
(ECC). This means that bits in memory that will have no impact
on the program are protected at the same expense than bits
that will have a major impact on the program’s outcome. This
is because it is impossible to statically assess which storage
bits are more likely to affect program reliability. Indeed, as the
placement of data in memory can change at every program
execution, all bits in DRAM are considered interchangeable.
Thus, to generalize the notion of AVF to memory, it is necessary
to use a metric dynamically, depending on the data stored at a
given bit, and on the way the program uses this data, at the
scale of a single program execution.
In this paper, we formalize the Memory Vulnerability Factor
(MVF), which is targeted at approximating the probability of
error in a program and has been used under different names in
the literature. We then extend this metric to take into account
false errors, which are reported but would otherwise have no
impact on the program being run. The MVF metric is dynamic,
adapting to program behaviour, yet is not application-specific
as it can be used for any program. We measure it using a cycle-
accurate simulator, as well as all previous generalisations of
AVF to memory [4], [5], [6]. We compare these metrics to the
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probability of an architecturally incorrect program outcome due
to a fault in its data, obtained from real-world fault injections.
These experiments demonstrate that the false error aware mem-
ory vulnerability metric correlates best with the probability
of an architecturally incorrect program outcome, and gives a
consistent upper bound on this probability.
The paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we define
the vulnerability metrics for memory, while in Section 3 we
introduce the metrics used in the state of the art. In Section 4
we present our experimental setup and in Section 5 our results,
before presenting our concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 METRIC DEFINITION
The goal of quantifying memory vulnerability is to assess which
bits matter to the outcome of a program. In order to do this, we
first present a classification of the possible outcomes of a pro-
gram, then introduce the MVF metric, whose scope is limited
to memory, while taking into account program behaviour. We
then present the False Error Aware (FEA) MVF, improving the
MVF by analysing how false errors can in fact be ignored.
2.1 Linking Program Outcome and Vulnerability
We categorise the outcome of a program as an Architecturally
Correct Execution (ACE) when its execution is indistinguish-
able from an execution without errors. This includes executions
with errors that are corrected, ignored, or benign (thus have no
measurable impact on the final state). Architecturally incorrect
executions (un-ACE) may be due to a program that finishes
running improperly (e.g. crash), stops making progress, finishes
but returns an incorrect result, or finishes and returns a correct
result but having performed more work than a non-faulty
execution. The goal of assessing vulnerability in memory is
to know, dynamically, which bits have a higher likelihood of
causing an un-ACE outcome.
When encoding data with ECC, data bits are stored together
with redundant bits, as an ECC codeword. This makes comput-
ing a per-bit metric such as vulnerability slightly more com-
plex. For example a Single-Error-Correct Double-Error-Detect
(SECDED) code means any single bit error in the codeword is
correctable [7]. However, the bits in the codeword still affect
the state of the program. To reflect this, we attribute to an
ECC codeword stored in memory the average vulnerability
of all the bits in the unencoded data. This allows to quantify
the importance of the data that is encoded beyond the simple
ECC strength considerations. The properties of the AVF are also
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2maintained: the structure’s value is still the average of that of all
its bits. Thus, in order to assess the real impact of faults in data
stored in memory, we need to measure the program outcomes
when injecting faults in the unencoded data bits.
2.2 Memory is Vulnerable Before Being Loaded
As storage bits are interchangeable from one program execution
to another, the vulnerability of a memory location is linked
to the data that is stored at that location, rather than to the
physical DRAM cells themselves. Therefore, we choose to use
a definition of memory vulnerability that depends dynamically
on the use of a given memory location by a program.
To do this, we classify data residing in memory as ei-
ther vulnerable or safe, based on the next memory access
to this data. Data may be read or overwritten. We classify
data as vulnerable when the next access to this data is a
load, as any faults in this data will be propagated in the
memory request. Conversely, data is safe when the next ac-
cess to it is a store. We then define the Memory Vulnerabil-
ity Factor (MVF) for each memory location as the fraction of
time a memory location contains data that will be read. That is,
MV F = vulnerable time/(safe time+ vulnerable time).
The core idea of this definition of the MVF is that only data
that is loaded from memory can impact the program state,
while ignoring any effects outside memory. Such effects can
mask errors in data that is loaded in memory, for example if
the data is not used by the program, has a negligible impact, or
has been loaded speculatively.
2.3 Accounting for False Detected Uncorrected Errors
The MVF is overestimating the probability of a bit affecting the
program outcome, by considering data that is fetched only to
be overwritten as vulnerable. Let us look at a write or a set
of writes that spans a full ECC word (thus 8B for SECDED
or 16B for ChipKill-level ECC [8]). In a cache with a write-
allocate policy, if these writes cause a cache miss, data will
be fetched from memory. Any miscorrected errors in this ECC
word are masked by the new data being written. Similarly, any
uncorrectable errors would be masked as well, if they did not
trigger an exception: these are called false errors. Contrarily to
benign errors, which affect the program in a negligible way,
false errors are caused by faults in data that is not consumed by
the program. Thus, in a system without ECC, or with an ECC
scheme that has no Detected Uncorrected Errors (DUEs) [9],
the MVF incorrectly categorises that data as vulnerable, as it is
based only on fetching the data.
A system with DUE can be enhanced to avoid causing
exceptions on false errors, by simply delaying the reporting
of any error until it is actually consumed. This is a common
pattern in resilience, used for example to handle DUEs in
memory discovered during scrubbing. An application likely
to access that erroneous data is not terminated preventively,
but only whenever it attempts to access the location of the er-
ror [10]. Similarly at the architectural level, delaying a machine
check exception due to an incorrect instruction allows to avoid
exceptions for instructions that do not affect correctness (no-
ops, prefetches, etc.), or whose results are either not committed
or ultimately do not affect the program [11].
Thus, we can write off false errors as not affecting the
program state. Accordingly, we differentiate between MVF,
whose definition is given in Section 2.2 and which limited to
what happens in memory, and False Error Aware MVF (FEA). To
compute the latter, we consider a memory location as safe not
only when it is next accessed by a store, but also when it is next
accessed by a fill request whose contents will be overwritten.
This slight difference in what classifies as a vulnerable memory
access does not affect the metrics’ mathematical properties.
2.4 Vulnerability under Transient Fault Models
Both the MVF and FEA metrics relate naturally to the proba-
bility of consuming a fault, under the common hypotheses for
transient fault models.
If we suppose that faults happen randomly and inde-
pendently of one another, we can model them using an ex-
ponential model, with λ the average fault arrival rate. For-
mally, we define for any location in memory S and U , the
sets of safe and unsafe accesses to that location (i.e. re-
spectively stores and loads for the MVF), and ta and fa,
the time and the number of faults consumed by any ac-
cess a respectively. Since safe accesses overwrite faults, we
have a ∈ S ⇒ fa = 0. For unsafe accesses, we consider the
period pa before an access a. This lasts pa = ta − tprev(a),
where prev(a) = max{b ∈ S ∪ U |tb < ta}. Thus for unsafe
accesses, we have P (fa > 0) = 1− P (fa = 0) = 1− e−λpa ,
hence the overall probability of consuming a fault is
P (F ) =
∑
u∈U (1− e−λpu). If we reasonably assume that faults
are rare, i.e. that the program execution time T is such that
λT  1, then we can approximate P (F ) ≈ λ∑u∈U pu, which
is the total time spent before unsafe accesses multiplied by λ.
The vulnerability V is the fraction of time a memory location
contains data that is unsafe, thus with the same notations,
V = 1
T
∑
u∈U pu. We then have P (F ) ≈ λTV , which confirms
the intuition of the vulnerability V being proportional to the
probability of consuming a fault in memory.
3 RELATED WORK GAUGING MEMORY VULNERABILITY
Previous work has studied the variable vulnerability of data in
memory using metrics similarly inspired by the AVF.
Yu et al. define the Data Vulnerability Factor (DVF) [4] per
data structure d, defined as the multiplication of the structure’s
size Sd, the program execution time T , the number of accesses
to this structure in memory Nha, and the overall fault rate
FIT : DV Fd = FIT · T · Sd ·Nha. They then use mathematical
models to compute the DVF based on memory access patterns.
Luo et al. use the safe ratio, which is the fraction of time that
data resides in memory before being overwritten [5]. This is the
same as the MVF, except that it chooses to quantify the opposite
of vulnerability. The MVF and the safe ratio sr are related by
MV F + sr = 1. Luo et al. do not inject faults in native runs,
instead using a debugger.
Gupta et al. [6] use two metrics, initially measuring the
MVF, defined as “the average duration that data is stored in
memory before being loaded”. They then use a proxy metric,
which is the ratio of stores (ST ) to loads (LD), thus ST/LD,
for the purpose of their runtime page-placement algorithm.
The analysis of the impact of faults is never done with the real
program outcome, as the experiments are run inside FaultSim,
a Monte-Carlo model-based simulator, where loading an uncor-
rectable or undetected error is equated with program failure.
4 METHODOLOGY
To compare the vulnerability metrics with the probability of
un-ACE outcomes in the event of faults, we examine outcomes
when injecting faults in native parallel runs of the Conjugate
Gradient (CG), and measure vulnerability ratings precisely
using a cycle-accurate simulation infrastructure. We first ex-
plain the simulator setup, and then detail the fault injection
experiments before presenting the benchmark, CG.
3TABLE 1: TaskSim cache and memory parameters
cache shared assoc. size latency MSHRs
L1D private 8-way 32kB 4 cycles 32
L2 private 8-way 256kB 12 cycles 32
L3 shared 16-way 20MB 28 cycles 128
memory max bandwidth size latency
16GB/s 32GB 155 cycles
4.1 Measuring the Memory Vulnerability
To be able to gather enough information about when data
reaches or is fetched from memory, we use a cycle-accurate
simulator. We extend TaskSim [12], [13], a task-trace based mul-
ticore simulator, to compute the exact memory vulnerability
ratings of data. Its infrastructure relies on task-based execution
models to generate detailed traces for each task, including
the basic blocks that are executed and memory addresses that
are accessed. TaskSim’s multicore architecture simulator then
simulates parallel runs in detail by fetching and simulating
all instructions, using a simple core model and a full memory
hierarchy. The simulator also relies on a real runtime system, to
schedule the tasks across the simulated hardware.
To compute the various vulnerability metrics, we capture
all loads and stores and the time at which they reach main
memory. We then update at each access the necessary counters
per memory location: time before stores, time before loads,
FEA safe time (before fill requests whose contents will be
overwritten), and number of loads and stores. From this data,
we compute the fraction of time that each location is vulnerable,
the DVF and the load-to-store ratio. We only update these
counters during the Region Of Interest (ROI), thus while the
solver is running. We compute all metrics at a 64 bit granularity,
which is the granularity used for SECDED and a subset of the
granularity commonly used in ChipKill-level ECC.
We trace applications on an Intel x86 64 Xeon E5-2670 and
simulate a multicore architecture whose configuration mirrors
the Xeon E5-2670’s characteristics. It consists of 8 cores running
at a frequency of 2.6GHz, each with a reorder buffer of 168
entries, and one thread per core. The memory hierarchy’s
parameters are summed up in Table 1. All cache levels have 64B
lines, write-back and write-allocate policies, are non inclusive,
and track outstanding misses in Miss Status Handling Registers
(MSHRs). In the simple model used for main memory, every
request has the same latency and returns a full cache line.
4.2 Measuring the Program Outcome
To analyse and validate the memory vulnerability metrics, they
need to be compared against the outcomes of injecting faults
in the memory of the program. Thus, we inject faults in native
parallel runs on a real system, using the same Xeon E5-2670 as
used for the simulation infrastructure.
Faults are injected using a separate thread, at a uniformly
random point in the targeted application-level data, and at a
uniformly random time during the ROI. The injector thread
sleeps for the selected amount of time, then injects the single
event by flipping the selected bit. Each experiment consists of a
single fault injection, and each experimental campaign consists
of at least 6500 parallel CG runs per data structure.
The prologue, which consists of generating the program’s
input, and the epilogue, which consists of verifying the pro-
gram’s output, are not considered in this analysis. The program
runs until it finishes abnormally or until completion, in which
case it verifies the validity of the solution it found. This ver-
ification is always done against the unmodified input data. If
the program performs more work (in this case, more iterations)
Listing 1: Conjugate Gradient (CG) pseudo code
1 old ⇐ +∞ , d′ ⇐ 0
2 f o r t in 0..tmax :
3 g ⇐ b−Ax i f t ≡ 0 (mod 50) e l s e g − αq
4 ⇐ ||g||2
5 i f  < tol : break
6 β ⇐ /old
7 d⇐ βd′ + g
8 q ⇐ Ad
9 α⇐ /〈q, d〉
10 x⇐ x+ αd
11 old ⇐ 
12 swap (d ,d′ )
than the ACE baseline, we classify it as un-ACE regardless
of the validity of the solution. If the program does not finish
within 10× the baseline (ACE) execution time, we classify its
execution as un-ACE and interrupt it.
4.3 The Conjugate Gradient Benchmark
To perform our experiments, we use the Conjugate Gradient
(CG) as a benchmark, whose pseudo-code is presented in
Listing 1 [14]. CG solves Ax = b for x, where A is a sparse
symmetric positive definite matrix. x, g, d, d′, and q are vectors,
and , old, α and β are scalars. The matrix A is stored in
memory in compressed sparse row format. Thus, we refer to
it as 3 separate data structures: the rows Ar, columns Ac, and
values Av. We solve the 3D Poisson’s equation discretised with
a 27 point stencil, and a size of 643 rows.
We implement CG using OmpSs, a task-based dataflow
programming model, with tasks each generating one block of
each of the vectors or sums (in the case of reductions) [15]. We
use two copies of d and swap their pointers (line 15) to allow
delaying tasks that depend on one copy, such as x⇐ x+ αd.
This allows the runtime to ignore the false dependency due to
overwriting d, and to overlap x’s update with operations that
incur load imbalance such as 〈d, q〉, thus improving scalability.
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we compare the probability of un-ACE outcomes
when injecting faults against the MVF, FEA, and other metrics
used by related work.
5.1 Memory Vulnerability Metric Validation
The results of fault injections in real runs, categorising the
outcomes as architecturally correct (ACE) or not (un-ACE),
are presented as bars in Figure 1, while the various vulner-
ability ratings obtained from cycle-accurate simulations are
presented as lines. The bars represent the probability of an
un-ACE outcome, and are obtained from fault injections. Data
structures are sorted in increasing un-ACE probability, and
confidence intervals are not displayed, as they are too small.
The largest interval is for g, whose probability of suffering an
un-ACE outcome is in [22.0%, 24.6%] with 99% confidence. The
vulnerability metrics, displayed as lines, are the MVF, defined
in Section 2.2 and similar to the safe ratio [5], the FEA, defined
in Section 2.3, the load-to-store ratio [6], and finally the DVF [4]
in the separate graph above.
The probabilities of un-ACE outcomes are consistent with
the memory access pattern of the CG algorithm for each data
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Fig. 1: ACE frequency when injecting faults in real runs, and
simulation-based vulnerability ratings per CG data structure
structure, taking into account that the solver converges in 27
iterations for this matrix and that most of the time of one
iteration is spent computing the matrix-vector multiplication.
The b vector is only used for the initial computation of the
residual, and the data is never read afterwards, hence with a
vulnerability of 2.9%. SinceAc andAr are arrays of indexes, it is
expected that faults in these data structures may cause crashes,
in the form of segmentation faults. All other data consists
of floating point values. When injecting faults in these struc-
tures, un-ACE program outcomes are almost never crashes, but
instead incorrect or slower executions. Furthermore, we can
note that these data structures generally have lower un-ACE
outcomes than the integer ones. While this is due in part to
the way data is accessed by the program, it is also inherent to
floating point data, as shown by the difference between Ac and
Av, which both have the exact same access pattern. Errors in
lower-order bits of floating point data likely have a negligible
effect on the solver, as their relative significance is small.
The various vulnerability metrics are presented as lines in
Figure 1. Comparing the MVF (unbroken line) and FEA (dashed
line) to the un-ACE frequency, we can see that both metrics
provide an upper bound on this probability. The FEA gives a
much tighter bound for the d, d′ and q vectors. This is due
to these vectors being overwritten and not updated, as can
be seen in Listing 1. Thus, false errors would be overwritten
approximately 50% of the time: after the vector is read and
before it is computed again. On the other hand, g and x are
updated, thus with a read-modified-write sequence for each el-
ement. Accordingly, both MVF and FEA evaluate these vectors
in the same way. Finally, Av, Ac, and Ar are only ever read,
and b is only read once at the beginning of the execution, thus
mostly contains inconsequential data. Overall, FEA correlates
better with the un-ACE probability.
As the load-to-store ratio LD/ST [6] is unbounded (b’s
rating is +∞ for example) we normalize it as LD/(LD + ST ),
and present this value as the dotted line in Figure 1. This
transformation maintains the relative order of the ratings’
values while bringing them back in the interval [0, 1]. We see
several problems with this load-to-store ratio: b, which is mostly
inconsequential, is rated equally vulnerable as Ar, and both
x and g have the lowest vulnerability ratings while being the
third and fourth most vulnerable vectors, where faults cause
un-ACE results with probabilities of 25% and 46% respectively.
Furthermore, the load-to-store ratio over-estimates but also
under-estimates the vulnerability of considerable chunks of
data, and can thus not be safely used as an upper bound on
failure probability. For example, the first parts of vector q to
be computed are very vulnerable, and the last ones very safe,
as computing this vector is an operation that takes a long time.
However, the load-to-store ratio rates the whole vector with the
same vulnerability, by considering only the number of accesses.
The DVF metric [4] is not bounded either and its values are
high and very spread out, hence we display them on a log scale
at the top of Figure 1. The main factor impacting the DVF of a
data structure is its size, which causes Ac and Av to have the
highest values. The most critical data, Ar, is rated as the second
safest data structure by the DVF. The other values are very close
together, in increasing order: d and d′, followed by g and x, and
then q. Overall this correlates poorly with the probability of
un-ACE outcomes, and the fact that the metric is not bounded
makes it harder to use at runtime. Indeed, the metric only has
meaning when comparing values relative to each other, making
it impossible to set thresholds on DVF values for example.
6 CONCLUSION
A number of metrics aim at quantifying the risk associated with
encountering an error in data in memory. Comparing these
metrics with the likelihood of architecturally incorrect execu-
tions due to a fault in memory indicates that the False Error
Aware Memory Vulnerability Factor (FEA), which is introduced
in this paper, is the most accurate one. This can be explained
by the fact that it takes into account timing effects, as opposed
to DVF or store-to-load ratios, and the fact that overwriting
data that has not been accessed in a while may cause false
errors, which can be ignored. This work also highlights that
hardware support to track false errors in the cache hierarchy
would likely significantly decrease error rates due to DUE in
memory. Furthermore, this work opens the door to runtime-
level optimizations that can now accurately model the risk
associated with any given data.
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